The views of ninety-four English and Welsh chief police officers were recorded in interviews between 2008 and 2010, covering oversight, accountability and operational independence, and the impact this may have on policing. They discuss Police Authorities, the proposed police crime commissioner, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Home Office both in terms of their own democratic accountability and the role of these bodies in the monitoring the roles and actions of chief officers. Their views, representing both the current and future leadership of the police, offer an important insight into understanding contemporary policing and the relationship between police and oversight bodies in the United Kingdom.
Introduction
Debates around international police co-operation soon centre on differences in the relationship between that state and the police. Whilst acknowledging some evidence of convergence of police practice in Europe, there are still substantial differences across the world in terms of the relationship between the police and the state, the variety of systems in place to hold police services to account and the mechanisms intended to provide oversight and transparency in policing. Police services often share information across borders, look with interest at policing in other jurisdictions and acknowledge the insights that can be achieved through looking at alternatives. This paper explores the views of chief police officers in England & Wales regarding the mechanisms for accountability and oversight that influence the way in which they lead their police services. The reference to 'appropriate space' is not to the politicisation of the police per se, but rather to the relationships between operational policing, the level of political influence exerted upon forces and the need to exercise operational independence on the basis of professional judgements of local community needs by senior officers and their teams. However, the police have had a history of inquiries (Macpherson 1999 , IPCC 2007 , which have called for evergreater accountability reflecting concerns around police practice. This has entailed an increasing role for police authorities.
The debate around police accountability centres on the proposition that accountability needs to be more effective but how that is effectively achieved is open to debate (Mawby and Wright, 2005) . One view is that accountability to local communities is the key (Home Office, 2008) , another view promotes political accountability along political party lines as the way forward (Freeman and Webster, 2006) . A third view proffers an amalgam of local and national oversight (embodied in the proposal for a "police crime commissioner", Gove, 2005) . The police are currently held to account through a triangle comprising of police authorities, the Home Office and the Chief Constable of the service, and this paper aims to explore the chief police officer perspective on these three related forms of oversight (also known as the 'Tripartite Arrangement').
Empirical Research
From 2008-2010, Bryn Caless interviewed 85 chief officers of police in England and Wales, and obtaining completed questionnaires from another nine. This total of ninety-four participants represents forty-three percent of all chief officers (there are 218 in total), and is the first major research study of chief officers in England and Wales since Robert Reiner's Chief Constables (1991) . Representatives of all ranks of chief officer were interviewed (unlike Reiner who, a generation ago, focused only upon Chief Constables), because all these participants have substantial experience in policing, have held senior positions and strategically influence policing and its direction whatever the political landscape may be. A semi-structured interview was adopted to encourage an unrestrained narrative from participants. Owing to their busy schedules, it was often difficult to arrange time to meet chief officers. Where participants were willing but unable to facilitate a face-to-face appointment, questionnaires were used as a substitute. All chief officers were given anonymity, both in the face-to-face interviews and in the questionnaires, and each was allocated an arbitrary number which bears no relation to the order in which the individual was interviewed.
Sampling was largely dictated by availability and preparedness to be interviewed. Four chief officers of those approached, refused to be interviewed. A further seven made arrangements to meet the researcher but had to decline and could not manage a second attempt. Although there are limitations in the use of interviewing as a primary method of research, it is important to acknowledge that observation methods are not practical in the context of this research and questionnaires can result in low completion rates. In the context of research on senior police officers, it is our experience that an interview strategy is the only viable method in which to collect meaningful data from a limited sample. (Savage et al, 2000 ). Yet we should try to understand them, because they make daily command decisions which can affect the public, they authorise armed interventions and approve covert police operations. Malthouse' somewhat intemperate comments should not be taken in isolation. The political significance of his statement can be located firmly in his support for the appointment of a "police crime commissioner" (PCC), which will fundamentally reform police accountability.
Police authorities will be replaced in 2012 or thereabouts, by elected PCCs who would similarly hold chief officers to account, and, like police authorities, appoint and dismiss Chief Constables. Malthouse expresses a common belief (see Williams, 2003 and Mawby and Wright, 2005) The unease expressed by chief police officers, of which this opinion is an example, appears not to be about the challenge itself so much as the extent of the knowledge and understanding which informs such challenges. The police premise is that police authorities have an important and necessary local role in influencing chief officers (APA, 2007) , but when the demands made of chief officers are often unrelated either to the will of the people or to police effectiveness; they may concern some private political agenda, or be unrealistic in terms of what the police can actually do. This can make the action of holding chief officers to account particularly problematic: The police authority has other powers too, such as being the formal employer of all police staff (that is, members of the force aside from warranted police officers), and since 2009, the police authority annually appraises the Chief Constable and contributes to the Performance Development Reviews (PDRs) of the subordinate chief officers in the top team. This combination of 'scrutineer of spend', employer and appraiser, makes a police authority powerful, the upshot of all of which is that they can be accused of interfering with the operational independence of the police. One chief officer noted: Another noted that the police operated at a disadvantage because there was inequity between the police /authority relationship and the tendency of the latter to be simply critical: The police have had minor problems from inception with the bodies which assess if the force's expenditure is appropriate and whether or not the force delivers policing which is 'efficient and effective ' (Emsley, 1996; Brain, 2010) . HMIC and the Home Office also make qualitative judgments about an individual force or through 'thematic' inspections and nationally by comparison of data returns (Audit Commission, 2009). These oversight mechanisms are formally enforced at both local and national levels (Cockcroft and Beattie, 2009) . Some chief officers argue that the police authority oversight by Police Authorities has become an excuse to impinge on or influence the 'operational independence' of the police, and that therefore, the "appropriate space" is encroached upon: Another chief officer thought that it was a matter of properly 'channelling' the police authority's energy in a constructive way: One chief officer commented that the Police Authority had its own responsibilities, increased by engagement in local partnerships with agencies and bodies other than the police, corporately to deliver community safety. This meant that the police authority rather than the Chief Acting "in the public interest" is the basis of this determination, and is part of the government's intention to make policing generally more accountable (O'Neill, 2010b; Gove, 2005 One chief officer believed that those who are critical of HMIC might themselves be deficient as leaders or have something that they wanted to hide:
Interviewee 82: I actually get on with the HMIs and C/HMI rather well and enjoy the challenge they pose. It's not easy being the upholders of standards and of course they will incur the dislike of poorly-performing forces and weak or back-sliding chief officers.
However, this suggestion that only the 'weak or back-sliding' chief officers criticise HMIC is not supported by our research data: 
Home Office
The creation of the Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, in 1829 (Hurd, 2007) , demonstrated from the beginning that the police were to be controlled by a Department This consolidates the principle that whoever controls the purse-strings can influence what is done with the money and at first this was wholly monopolised by the Home Office, but latterly the budget for the police is split between the Home Office and the local Police Authority (and from 2012, we presume, the PCC).
The police dislike the notion that local police authorities overstep the boundaries of police operational independence, and deprecate the 'duality' of HMIC's roles as assessor and developer. Their reservations about political direction and influence by the Home Secretary and the Home Office are even more strongly expressed: Another chief officer went further, arguing that "the mandarins in Whitehall" did not appreciate the difference between an idea theoretically arrived at and the implementation of that idea in practice:
Interviewee 49: They forget that policy isn't policing. They're all very well in their remote ivory tower, handing down writ to us but they don't have to get fucked trying to make it work. Too many of them wake up with an idea and fly down to us from the Planet Loony the same day, without testing it, thinking about it or knowing whether or not it'll work.
Another chief officer, who has had extensive dealings with both Home Office Ministers and top Civil Servants over a number of years believed that there were too many occasions when the Home Office ignored considered police advice or dismissed their counter-arguments, because officials and Ministers had already made up their minds and would not be deflected, whatever the merits of the chief officers' observations: The attitude of chief officers to politicians, as this comment suggests, is coloured by a belief that all politicians will respond with instinctive nervousness to events by a "knee-jerk": Office's desire to control the police, a political uneasiness that the police function would get out of hand which has its origins in the Napoleonic War (Pellew, 1982) . The current government's apparent intention to relinquish control of the police to PCCs (May, 2010; Kemp, 2011) is not likely to be sustained. We have seen few examples from history where politicians have not interfered with policing. The history of the British government's relations with the police since 1829 is such that control has been progressively centralised. This probably remains the default model for police governance.
Summary and conclusions
Police authorities act locally, on behalf of communities in specific areas, to hold 'their' police force to account. They have the remit, or at least the authority, to speak for the public. But noone seems certain where the independence of police operational activities ends and the proper democratic exercise of oversight by a police authority begins. Chief police officers can be stubborn and mulish when challenged and equally, some police authorities can seem overtly political or petty. The lack of definition can be catered for, at least in part, by protocols designed to clarify respective responsibilities (see Caless' extended discussion of this in
Policing at the Top, 2011, Chapter 3), but ambiguities persist. At the base of some of the distaste expressed about police authorities is chief officers' distrust of well-meaning but amateur encroachments on their professional knowledge and judgement. It seems unlikely that the advent in 2012 of the PCCs will mitigate these reservations to any marked degree; indeed, some think that the PCC will encroach further on police preserves (Pointon, 2010) .
Caution about and suspicion of HMIC is endemic in the tensions which exist between the assessor and the assessed, but this has clearly been exacerbated since HMIC took on the mantle of the 'fierce guardian of public interests', characterised by an altogether more confrontational approach with police forces. Relations, as chief officers have noted, are at a low ebb, added to which is a sort of perennial uneasiness about HMIC's double function of assessing a force and developing its chief officer cadre. Chief officers consistently return to the proposition that a separate professional organisation should assess, promote and develop individual chief officers. It is hard to dispute the logic of this position, provided that such an organisation is truly independent of those whom it assesses (a point repeatedly made to Bryn Caless by the Chief HMI in interview).
HMIC, for its part, registers an indifference to chief officers' views which borders on the dismissive and it is unwavering in its public mission, wherever that leaves the police. Chief officers themselves seem unaware of the impression they give: their caution and hostility about police authorities, HMIC and the Home Office could be construed as aversion to being accountable for what they do. Yet many chief officers noted continually that they had no problems whatever with being held accountable, provided that the 'holding' was fair process and part of a mechanism that could itself be challenged. Indeed, when commenting publicly on the proposals for PCCs to replace police authorities in overseeing the police, Sir Hugh Orde, President of ACPO, said:
Chief Officers understand the need to be accountable to local communities -policing's relationship with the public we serve is the source of its legitimacy and consequently its effectiveness (Caswell, 2010) .
The Home Office is persistently seen negatively by most chief officers; indeed, of all opinions of oversight, the Home Office registered the very lowest in chief officer esteem. The undercurrents of tension between chief officers and their political masters probably existed from the outset (Pellew, 1982) , but, possibly as the result of very large amounts of criminal legislation passed by successive Labour administrations from 1997 -2010, (some 3,000 according to the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies at King's College, London, 2007) , this has seemed to intensify. At the same time, while the Home Office (like HMIC) can appear indifferent and inert in the face of criticism -some at least of it, well-founded -it cannot be conducive to harmonious working for one side to know that it is the object of detestation and for the other to know that its views are of no practical significance.
It is not solely a minority concern that we are examining, rather it is the collective view of a large body of very influential police officers. All organisations face accountability of some kind (to shareholders, to investors, trusts, boards, national bodies safeguarding standards and the like) but perhaps in policing, and particularly with the advent of the PCC, unease about the equity with which 'holding accountable' is exercised seems to be acute. There may be much controversy yet to come between forced changes to what David Cameron called "the last unreformed public service" (Freeman and Webster, 2006) , and resistance to those 'untested changes' that may be led by chief officers of police. 
